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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                              
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Phillip Moscato, a federal prison inmate, filed  
this petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court 
challenging the constitutionality of an institutional 
disciplinary hearing that resulted in certain adverse findings 
and the loss of his good-time credits.  Before reaching the 
district court, Moscato pursued his administrative remedies, but 
was barred from proceeding to the final level of administrative 
review because of his failure to file a timely appeal.  This 
appeal requires us to determine what effect such a procedural 
default has upon a federal prisoner's request for habeas corpus 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We hold that a prisoner's 
procedural default of his administrative remedies bars judicial 
review of his habeas petition unless he can show cause for the 
default and prejudice attributable thereto.  Because Moscato 
committed a procedural default of his administrative remedies by 
filing an untimely appeal and because he cannot show cause for 
the default, we are barred from review of the merits of his § 
2241 petition.  Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Moscato's petition, although we do so on different 
grounds. 
 
                                I. 
         On April 8, 1993, Moscato's unit at the Allenwood 
Federal Prison Camp was subjected to a shakedown.  According to 
Moscato, when he returned to his living area, he discovered that 
his possessions had been trampled and discarded on the floor. 
Moscato grew angry and, although the nature of his behavior 
remains in dispute, all parties agree that officers soon removed 
Moscato to the Lieutenant's office and charged him with Engaging 
in or Encouraging Others in a Group Demonstration.  See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 541.13 - Table 3 (Code 212) (1993).  That same night, Moscato 
was removed from the Federal Prison Camp and transported a few 
miles away to administrative segregation at Low Security 
Correctional Institution ("LSCI") Allenwood.   
         On May 4, 1993, Moscato received a disciplinary hearing 
at LSCI Allenwood.  Prior to the hearing, he requested that 
Correctional Officer David Ortiz and three inmates be called as 
witnesses on his behalf.  The disciplinary hearing officer 
refused to call any of Moscato's witnesses, stating that Ortiz 
was an adverse witness whose testimony was already before the 
hearing officer as part of the investigative report, and that the 
inmate witnesses, imprisoned at a different site, were 
unavailable for testimony.  In lieu of the inmates' oral 
testimony, the prison solicited from them brief statements that 
supported Moscato's recollection of the incident.  At the 
hearing, Moscato read a statement on his own behalf and denied 
engaging in or encouraging a group demonstration.  The hearing 
officer also reviewed statements from the five correctional 
officers who were present at the time of the incident.  No other 
witnesses appeared for either side. 
         After reviewing all of the evidence, the hearing 
officer found Moscato guilty of Attempting to Engage in or 
Encouraging Others in a Group Demonstration, see 28 C.F.R. § 
541.13(b) - Table 3 (Code 212A), rather than the substantive act 
itself.  According to the disciplinary hearing report, the 
sanctions imposed included: (a) disciplinary confinement; (b) 
forfeiture of 45 days statutory good time; (c) withholding of 10 
days statutory good time; and (d) termination of eligibility for 
camp good time effective April 8, 1993.  The hearing officer also 
recommended that Moscato receive a disciplinary transfer.  Prior 
to this incident, Moscato had 269 days of statutory good-time 
credit. 
         Moscato was informed of his right to appeal.  It is not 
clear from the record whether he appealed first to the Warden.  
It is clear, however, that he filed a timely appeal to the Bureau 
of Prisons, Northeast Regional Director, seeking restoration of 
his good time credits and expungement of his incident report, and 
that, on June 29, 1993, the appeal was denied.  Moscato attempted 
to appeal this decision to the Bureau's central office, the 
Office of General Counsel, but his appeal was not received until 
August 14, 1993, 16 days after the 30 day deadline.  The General 
Counsel denied the appeal as untimely.  Moscato submitted a 
second appeal to the General Counsel on October 12, 1993; it too 
was denied as untimely. 
         On April 14, 1994, Moscato filed an in forma pauperispetition 
requesting habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 on the grounds that the Bureau of Prisons had denied him 
due process at the disciplinary hearing and that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the hearing officer's determination of 
misconduct.  Moscato initially requested a rehearing of his 
disciplinary charge and restoration of his good-time credits.  
The U.S. Attorney opposed the petition on the merits but also 
argued that Moscato's untimely appeal to the General Counsel 
barred judicial review of his petition for relief.  In reply, 
Moscato asked that the decision of the hearing officer be 
reversed and that the incident report be expunged from his prison 
record. 
         By consent of the parties, the case was submitted to a 
magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).  The magistrate 
judge dismissed the petition on the merits without discussing 
whether the claims were barred due to a procedural default.  In 
rendering this decision, the magistrate judge noted that Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), permitted the use of written 
statements in lieu of live testimony where the witnesses are 
"unavailable."  The magistrate judge reasoned that because 
Moscato's witnesses were not imprisoned with Moscato at LSCI 
Allenwood, they were unavailable, and thus use of their written 
statements was not in error.  The magistrate judge also held that 
due process did not require the hearing officer to call Officer 
Ortiz because Ortiz was an adverse witness who had submitted a 
memorandum describing the incident.  See 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(c).  
Finally, the magistrate judge ruled that the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain a finding that Moscato had attempted to 
encourage a group demonstration.   This timely appeal followed.   
 
 
                               II. 
         Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust 
their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of 
habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.   Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 
1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Gabor, 
905 F.2d 76, 78 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990); Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 
694, 699 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987).  
Here, however, we are presented with a situation where, because 
Moscato failed to timely file an appeal to the General Counsel, 
Moscato cannot complete the administrative process.  The Bureau 
contends that, because Moscato's appeal was denied as untimely, 
he committed a procedural default that barred review of his § 
2241 petition.  We believe that Moscato's failure to satisfy the 
procedural rules of the Bureau's administrative process 
constitutes a procedural default.  Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 
353, 355 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1990); Sanchez, 792 F.2d at 697 (citingEngle v. 
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 124-25 & n.28 (1982)).  We must 
therefore determine what the effect of such a default should be. 
         The Seventh Circuit, which is the one Court of Appeals 
to have considered this precise issue, has held that if a 
prisoner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies due to 
a procedural default and the default renders unavailable the 
administrative process, review of his habeas claim is barred 
unless he can demonstrate cause and prejudice.  Sanchez, 792 F.2d 
at 699.  Because we believe that the preexisting law of 
procedural default and exhaustion of remedies renders the Seventh 
Circuit's decision inexorable, we endorse and adopt this holding. 
         The Supreme Court first articulated the cause and 
prejudice rule of procedural default in Davis v. United States, 
411 U.S. 233 (1973).  In Davis, a federal prisoner petitioning 
under § 2255 sought to challenge for the first time the 
composition of the grand jury that indicted him.  The petitioner 
had failed to comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 12, which required 
that a failure to object to the composition of a grand jury at 
trial constituted a waiver of the objection absent "for cause 
shown."  The Supreme Court determined that review of the habeas 
petition was barred absent a showing of cause for the failure to 
comply with the procedural requirement and of actual prejudice 
resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.  411 U.S. at 
243-45. 
         The Court later extended the rule of Davis to cases 
involving state and federal procedural rules that did not 
explicitly allow for an exception upon a showing for cause.  SeeFrancis v. 
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (cause and effect 
showing required to waive default of state procedural requirement 
that a challenge to grand jury composition be raised before 
trial); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 85, 89 (1977) (federal 
habeas barred absent showing of cause and prejudice when prisoner 
waived, under state law, his objection to admission of his 
confession); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982) 
(applying cause and prejudice rule in a federal habeas action 
involving Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, which contained no explicit 
exception to requirement for timely challenge to jury 
instructions); Neely v. Zimmerman, 858 F.2d 144, 145 (3rd Cir. 
1988) (failure to raise Massiah claim in post-verdict motion as 
required by state common law bars review of petitioner's habeas 
claim). 
         As the foregoing discussion indicates, a procedural 
default generally bars review of a federal habeas corpus petition 
absent a showing of cause and prejudice, "whether the default 
occurs in federal or state court, at trial or on appeal, and 
whether or not the procedural rule expressly incorporates a 
cause-and-prejudice standard." Sanchez, 792 F.2d 698.  The courts 
enforce the cause and prejudice rule in part to conserve judicial 
resources by requiring state or federal prisoners who seek habeas 
relief to present their claims to the venue initially available.  
Id.; Engle, 456 U.S. at 126-29 (discussion of costs associated 
with habeas review).  For federal prisoners challenging 
disciplinary proceedings, the initial venue is the administrative 
process.  By applying the cause and prejudice rule to habeas 
review of administrative proceedings, we insure that prisoners do 
not circumvent the appropriate agencies and needlessly swamp the 
courts with petitions for relief. 
         We also believe that a procedural default in the 
administrative process bars judicial review because "the reasons 
for requiring that prisoners challenging disciplinary actions 
exhaust their administrative remedies are analogous to the 
reasons for requiring that they exhaust their judicial remedies 
before challenging their convictions; thus, the effect of a 
failure to exhaust in either context should be similar."  
Sanchez, 792 F.2d at 698.  We require exhaustion for three 
reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual 
record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) 
permitting agencies to grant the relief requested conserves 
judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to 
correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.  
Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at 1052; see also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 
420 U.S. 738, 756-57 (1975) (exhaustion avoids duplicative 
proceedings and insures that judicial review will be informed and 
narrowed); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969) 
(circumvention of administrative process diminishes effectiveness 
of an agency by encouraging prisoners to ignore its procedures).  
Requiring petitioners to satisfy the procedural requirements of 
the administrative remedy process promotes each of these goals. 
         In sum, we hold that a federal prisoner who challenges 
a disciplinary proceeding within a federal institution, fails to 
exhaust his administrative remedies because of a procedural 
default, and subsequently finds closed all additional avenues of 
administrative remedy, cannot secure judicial review of his 
habeas claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice. 
 
                               III. 
         The district court did not rule on whether Moscato 
could excuse his procedural default.  Although we could remand 
for further proceedings, when we reviewed the supplemental 
briefing on the issue of cause, we were struck by the lack of 
suggestion that anything other than Moscato's dilatoriness caused 
the appeal to be filed late.  Where, in the face of an explicit 
opportunity to do so, a petitioner fails to allege the existence 
of an external impediment, a remand for a hearing is unnecessary 
because there is no factual dispute to resolve.  Cf. Wainwright, 
433 U.S. at 91; Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1528 n.45 (11th 
Cir. 1995); Sanchez, 792 F.2d at 699.  Because Moscato cannot 
show cause, we need not address the question of actual prejudice.  
Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 863 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 504 
U.S. 944 (1992). 
         Accordingly, because Moscato committed a procedural 
default of his administrative remedies, and because he cannot 
show cause for the default, his habeas petition filed pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 is barred from review on the merits.  The order 
of the magistrate judge dismissing the petition will therefore be 
affirmed. 
